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"In the long run, as Los Angeles drinks, the
lake shrinks."'
1. Introduction

Litigation's Bounded
Effectiveness and the Real
Public Trust Doctrine:
The Aftermath of the Mono
Lake Case*
By Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold&
and Leigh A. Jewell&

Litigation obviously plays a significant role
in environmental and natural resources policy.2 However, the effectiveness of environmental litigation - both as a means of resolving
disputes and as a means of protecting the
environment - is hotly debated.3 Setting aside
questions about the legitimacy, fairness, and
efficiency of litigation and judicial decisions in
resolving environmental and natural resources
conflicts, one can easily become overwhelmed
with the single question of environmental litiReprinted with modifications and permission from Beyond
Litigation: Case Studies in Water Rights Disputes (Craig Anthony
(Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell eds., forthcoming 2001 from the
Environmental Law Institute). © Environmental Law Institute,
2001, http://www.eli.org.
& Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Land Resources, Chapman University School of Law.
S Candidate, (uris Doctor, Chapman University School of
Law, Class of 2002,
I. Robert Crabbe, As Mono Lake Rises, Its Political Climate Is
Slowly Changing, Los Angeles Times Oct. 26, 1986, at WL 2144113.
2. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law"
Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 241-47 (2000); see also
FREDERICK R. ANDERSON et

al.,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND

POLICY, 3d ed. 24-25 (3d.ed. 1990); ROBERT L. FISCHMAN et al., AN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWANTHOLOGY 153 (1996); FRANK P GRAD & JOEL A.
MINTZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4th ed. 5-7, 1159-1336 (2000); WILLIAM
MURRAY TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND

MATERIALS, 2d ed. 181-232 (1997).

3. Scholarship discussing the effectiveness of environmental litigation includes Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts,
46 VAND. L.REV. I (1993); Rosemary O'Leary, The Impact of Federal
Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV.549 (1989); and
Joseph L.Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter
Sax, Public Trust). Scholarship contesting the impact of environmental litigation includes Grad & Mintz, supra note 2 at 14-16;
Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and
Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE EvNVrL. L.& POL Y F.39 (2001),
Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the
Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L.REV. 547 (1997); and
Richard I.Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty
in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 631 (1986). Professor Tarlock offers the most insightful and
balanced view, highlighting the tremendous impact environmental litigation had in creating and shaping environmental
law, but questioning its continued effectiveness and environmental law enters its "second generation." Tarlock, supra note 2.
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gation's efficacy. For example, parties to environmental litigation often have conflicts and
problems that are much larger and more multifaceted than the legal issues addressed in litigation. There is a growing awareness that
forms of dispute resolution other than litigation may be needed to solve the parties' problems and resolve their complex mix of legal
and non-legal conflicts, and that dispute resolution
is often only a subset of problem solv• 4
4
ing. Furthermore, conflicts between parties to
environmental litigation often persist long
after the courts have "definitively" resolved the
legal issues in the case. 5 In many contexts, litigation may be dispute non-resolution. 6 Both
in the specific conflict in question and in other
conflicts over similar environmental and natural resources issues, a judicial decision may
have very little real impact on the parties'
actions or may have only a "shadow" impact.
The law in both theory and doctrine may not be
the law in practice 7
Speculation and grand theorizing about
the effectiveness of environmental litigation
adds little to the debate. Instead, empirical evidence is needed.8 Although scholars could
undoubtedly design rigorous statistical studies
to test the effectiveness of environmental litigation, such studies would arguably miss many
of the nuances of the ways in which environ4.
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Planning Milagros:
Environmental Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. I
(1998) ]hereinafter, Arnold, Environmental Justice]; Luke W. Cole,
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Carol E.
Dinkins, Shall We Fight or Will We Finish: Environmental Dispute
Resolution in a Litigious Society, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,398 (1984); Frank
P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 COL. 1.
ENVTL. L_ 157 (1989); Ann L. MacNaughton, Collaborative ProblemSolving in Environmental Dispute Resolution, I11) NAT. RES. & ENvr. 3
(Summer 1996); Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein, Towards a
Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. ArF L. REV.
311 (1980); Tarlock, supra note 2, at 242-43, 254-69.
5. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Litigation as Dispute NonResolution: Lessons from Case Studies in Water Rights Disputes, in BEYOND
LITIGATION:
CASE STUDIES IN WATER RIGHTS DISPUTES (Craig Anthony
(Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. lewell, eds., forthcoming 2001) (hereinafter, Arnold, Dispute Non-Resolution]; Ann E. Carlson, Standing for
the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 998-1003 (1998);
MacNaughton, supra note 4, at 3; Tarlock, supra note 2, at 254-56,
263-69.
6. Arnold, Dispute Non-Resolution, supra note 5.
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mental litigation is effective, ineffective, and
partially effective. Instead, case studies - qualitative empirical research - offer the rich
details and complex interplay of factors needed to shape our understanding of environmental and natural resources litigation, even if case
studies do not "prove" a thesis. 9 We have chosen to examine the effectiveness of environmental litigation by conducting a study of one
of the most famous environmental cases of the
twentieth century, involving judicially imposed
common law constraints on natural resources
exploitation to protect the environment:
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court.t ° The
case involved a conflict over Mono Lake, an
unusual and ecologically valuable lake in
Northern California, which was experiencing
dropping lake levels and the resulting environmental harm due to more than forty years of
diversions of water by Los Angeles for its water
supply. The case pitted a powerful, growing
urban area, protecting its long-standing, wellrecognized rights to appropriate water from
Mono Lake's feeder streams, against determined, creative environmentalists, who argued
the public trust doctrine prevents the recognition of water rights that result in environmental harm.
Public trust is a common law doctrine that
limits the power of state legislatures and their
administrative agencies from conveying land
7.

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS

SETTLE DISPUTES 137-55 (1991 ).
8. Many scholars have called for greater empirical work in
legal scholarship. See id. at 6-8, 137-55; Arnold, Environmental
Justice, supra note 4, at 88-89; Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against
Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 29-30 (1985);
John P Heinz, Why Study Law Among the Tiv (or Among the Los
Angelenos)?, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1269 (1985); Craig Allen Nard.
Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the
Academy and the Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347 (1995); Teresa
A. Sullivan, Methodological Realities: Social Science Methods and Business
Reorganizations, 72 WASH. U. L.O. 1291 (1994); Lee E. Teitelbaum,
An Overview of Law and Social Research, 35 1. LEG. ED. 465 (1985).
9. The works cited in note 8, supra, generally discuss both
quantitative and qualitative empirical research and their comparative advantages and disadvantages. For further comparisons
and research design methods, see JOHN W. CRESWELL, RESEARCH
DESIGN: QUALITATIVE
AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES

(1994):

MICHAEL

QUINN PATTON,
QUALITATIVE
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH METHODS, (2d
ed. 1990); ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND
METHODS, (2d ed. 1994).
10. 658 P2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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owned by the state lying under navigable
waters to private parties." As a general rule,
the states own the land under water present
within its borders so long as the body of water
meets the federal test of navigability.1 2 In The
Daniel Ball, the United States Supreme Court
articulated the federal test for navigability:
Those rivers must be regarded as public
navigable rivers in law which are navigable in
fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in
their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade
3
and travel on water.'
Lands under waters that meet the test for
navigability must be held in trust for the public. In other words, they belong to the people of
the state or, at a minimum, are conditioned on
an easement for public purposes such as navi4
gation, travel, fishing, and recreation.
The public trust responsibility is out of the
reach of any legislative body to change and
"Itlhe sovereign power itself ...

cannot, con-

sistently with the laws of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a
direct and absolute grant of the waters of the
state, divesting all the citizens of their common right.'" 5 California has long recognized
the public trust, and for nearly 100 years has
statutorily' 6 provided that the waters of the

state are owned by the people of California. 17
On its face, the public trust doctrine seems
at odds with the California system of appropriative water rights. At one end of the spectrum, the public trust doctrine facilitates
1. JOSEPH L. SAX ETAL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES 529 (3rd ed. 2000) [hereinafter SAX ET AL., WATER
RESOURCES]. Joseph Sax wrote the seminal work on the application
of the public trust doctrine to natural resources law. See Sax,
Public Trust, supra note 3.
12. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
13. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
14. See Carol M. Rose, loseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust,
25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351 (1998).
15. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,78 (1821).
16. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
17. Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust

preservation of public resources and promotes
environmental values and the public interest
over private control. In particular, the public
trust doctrine favors instream uses of water. At
the other end of the spectrum, sometimes
referred to as the inverse of the public trust,'8
the appropriative rights system rejects public
water rights in favor of development and consumption of water by private parties, as the
greatest good flows from private consumption. 19 Essentially, the prior appropriation sys-

tem endorses diverting water from its natural
course so long as private parties put such
diversions to beneficial use.20
The California Supreme Court finally
resolved the inevitable legal clash between
these two systems in its 1983 decision in
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court.2' In
what has been considered by some experts to
be among the top ten most important
American environmental law decisions,22 the
California Supreme Court did not choose one
system over the other. Instead, the Court
declared that the water law of California integrates both the public trust doctrine and the
appropriative rights system and placed a substantive obligation on the State Water
Resources Control Board to consider the
impact of appropriation rights on public trust
uses before allowing diversions and in reviewing diversions allowed without proper consideration of public trust values.23 Conceiving of
its integration of the two doctrines as requiring
that the Board to balance them, the Court did
not establish any specific allocation of water
for the Mono Basin, leaving the task for the
State Water Resources Control Board.24
Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L. 0. 541,
546 (1995) (citing People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P.
1152. 1159 (Cal. 1884)).
18. Id. at 552.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 Pl2d 709.

22. Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the
Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 701, 703 (1995).
23. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P2d at 712.
24. Id. at 732.
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The significance of the California Supreme
Court not choosing one system over the other
cannot be understated. If the Court had chosen
only the public trust system, protecting ecological and aesthetic uses of Mono Lake,25
diversions supplying Los Angeles residents
with water certainly would have been curtailed.
Furthermore, settled expectations for longstanding water rights would have been thrown
into chaos. Curtailment of the diversions still
would have left Los Angeles with a need to find
replacement water, potentially damaging other
water resources within the State, and left all
water appropriators statewide in a state of
uncertainty over their rights. If, instead, the
Court had held that public trust uses did not
have to be considered, and only the appropriative rights system applied, damage to Mono
Lake and other water resources in California
would have continued. The public's interest in
navigable waters would have meant little if
appropriators could completely consume bodies of water for out-of-stream uses.
The Court set the stage for development of
"the real public trust doctrine": the public trust
doctrine in practice outside of judicial forums.
The survival of the Mono Lake ecosystem
required a judicial determination that the public trust doctrine limits (at least partially) prior
appropriation water rights. However, no single
court opinion - regardless of its legal landmark
status - would ensure the viability and impact
of public trust principles for Mono Lake or for
other water systems in California. The public
trust doctrine has taken on substantial meaning and value in the parties' post-decision
actions. Environmentalists' persistent litigation, negotiation with the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, education of
the public, and creative problem-solving, as
well as the cooperative responses of Los
Angeles, has led to an effective resolution of
the issue, or more broadly, an effective public
trust doctrine. This resolution includes substantially reduced diversions of water from the

Mono Basin, increased health of Mono Lake,
and sufficient water supplies to support the
rapidly growing Los Angeles metropolis without draining other water basins.
Part I of this case study discusses how the
conflict between environmentalists and Los
Angeles arose, and failed pre-litigation
attempts at resolving the conflict. Part 1I
describes the National Audubon litigation and
the California Supreme Court's decision in the
case. Part II explicates the aftermath of
National Audubon, including subsequent litigation under the California Fish and Game
Code, environmental activism and public education, negotiation, State Water Resources
Control Board decision making, and ultimate
agreement. This agreement resolved the conflict with a combination of reduced diversions
from the Mono Lake tributaries and publicly
funded reclamation and conservation programs.
Part IV of this case study contends that
environmental litigation, such as public trust
litigation, is characterized by "bounded effectiveness." Both litigation and judicial decisions
applying the public trust doctrine to uses of
natural resources are necessary but not sufficient to effectuate the values of the public
trust. The "real" public trust doctrine exists in
the aftermath of litigation: the parties' post-litigation actions that either resolve or do not
resolve legal conflicts.

25. There are two excellent Internet resources on Mono Lake's
natural, political, and legal history and characteristics. Available at
http//www.monolake.org & http.J/www.monobasinresearch.org.

Shrinking Mono Lake, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sep. 27, 1985, at WL
2876983.

26.

Steve Lawrence, Environmentalists campaigning for

If.

Pre-Litigation Background

A.

Mono Lake
One of North America's oldest bodies of
water, Mono Lake was formed a million years
ago in a volcanic area, and is most widely
known for its high salinity and limestone formations that resemble cactus along its shoreline.2 6 Located approximately 190 miles east of
San Francisco and 300 miles north of Los
Angeles,2 7 the lake sits near the eastern
entrance to Yosemite National Park and is the

27. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 704.
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second largest lake in California.18 Most of

Mono Lake a tourist attraction.3 5

Mono Lake's water supply has come from the
Sierra Nevada snowmelt, although the lake
receives some water from precipitation on its
surface. 29 The runoff from the snowmelt is carried to the west end of the lake via five freshwater streams: Mill, Lee Vining, Walker, Parker,
and Rush Creeks.3 °
Mono Lake is considered a terminal lake
because surface runoff and groundwater seepage end in the lake, resulting in the high salini-

B. The Diversions

ty.3 Mono Lake does not have fish due to its

high salinity. However, it does sustain a sizeable
population of brine shrimp.3 2 The shrimp popu-

lation feeds a large number of nesting and
migratory birds, making preservation of the population in the lake extremely important to
species in various migration routes.33 In addition, the lake has natural islands that serve as
protective habitat for a considerable breeding
colony of California gulls because the water
between the mainland and the island prevents
predators such as coyotes from reaching the
young.34 Finally, the unique scenery of towers
and spires on the shores, which Ansel Adams
depicted in his famous photographs, make
28. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P2d at 711.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22.
32. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P2d at 711.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The California agency with authority to grant appropriative rights has gone through various name changes since its
inception in 1913. ld; seealso ARTHUR L. LnTrLEWORTH & ERic L.
GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 113 (1995). Therefore, regardless of the
specific name given to the agency at any given time, "Water
Board" shall be used hereinafter to refer to the California agency
with authority to grant such rights.
37. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711.
38. Id. DWP is responsible for the water supply for the City
of Los Angeles. DWP recognized early in the twentieth century
that the city's needs would quickly surpass that which was available from local resources. Id. at 713. Thus, the city erected the
Owens Valley aqueduct in 1913 to transport water 233 miles from
the Owens River, through the Antelope-Mojave plateau, to the
city. Id. Because Los Angeles expanded so quickly, the Owens
River supply was strained, requiring DWP to locate another
source. Id. The natural choice was the Mono Basin due to its prox-

In 1940, the Division of Water Resources,36
which was the predecessor to the State Water
Rights Board and ultimately the State Water
Resources Control Board (hereinafter "Water
Board"), granted the City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (hereinafter
"DWP") a permit to appropriate almost the
complete flow of four of the five streams that
supply water into Mono Lake.37 Immediately
after receiving appropriative rights to the four
streams, DWP erected structures to divert
approximately half of the flow of the four
streams into DWP's Owens Valley aqueduct.38
Then, in 1970, DWP constructed another diversion tunnel, resulting in the diversion of
almost all of the flow of the four streams.3 9
The diversions resulted in widespread negative impacts in and around the lake. The level
of the lake dropped and the surface area of the
lake went down by one-third.40 In fact, between
1940 and 1970, Los Angeles diverted an average of 57,067 acre-feet 4 of water per year from
the Mono Basin, resulting in the lake level
dropping by an average of 1.1 feet per year.42 In
imity to the Owens River, allowing use of the aqueduct infrastructure already in existence, a very cost-effective way for the
city to obtain water. Id. According to Duane Buccholz, the district
engineer at the Bishop office of the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power in 1986, Mono Lake water is some of the cleanest and cheapest water in the state because the cost of the hundreds of miles of aqueducts were paid for years ago and it does
not require the expensive process of pumping the water over
mountain ranges. Crabbe, supra note 1. To this end, DWP purchased the riparian rights for Lee Vining, Walker, Parker, and Rush
Creeks, in addition to those for Mono Lake. Nat'l Audubon, 658
P.2d at 713. Once these purchases were complete, Los Angeles
applied to the Water Board for appropriative rights permits for
the four streams in 1940. Id.
39. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P2d at 711.
40. Id. at 711.
41. An acre-foot is the amount of water required to cover
one acre of land one foot of water in depth. Crabbe, supra note 1.
An acre-foot is approximately the amount used by five people living in a single-family home (with a small garden) in one year. id.
42. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714. Between 1970 and 1980,
following construction of a second aqueduct to increase flow by
50%, Los Angeles diverted 99,580 on average per year from the
Mono Basin. Id. Over the 40-year span from 1940 to 1980, the
diversions caused Mono Lake to shrink from an area of 85 square
miles to 60.3 square miles and its surface level dropped from
6,416 feet above sea level to 6,376 feet above sea level. Id.
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addition to the physical effects on the lake, the
chemical composition increased significantly
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in salinity.

The California gull became particularly
endangered by the decrease in lake level.
Ninety-five percent of the state's California
gulls and twenty-five percent of all of the
California gulls in existence nested at Mono
Lake according to the 1979 California
Department of Water Resources and United
States Department of the Interior joint study
Task Force Report.4 4 Additionally, one of two
main islands that protect bird breeding
grounds joined with the mainland because of
the lake level drop, allowing predators access
to the nesting grounds.4 5 Coyotes actually
reached one of the popular breeding islands by
1979, immediately resulting in a significant
decline in breeding nests.46 Significantly, in
1981, almost all of the infant birds did not survive to adulthood.47
By the time the parties reached litigation,
the predicted, continued effects of the diversions were hotly contested. However, it
seemed apparent that aesthetic and ecological
48
assets of the lake were in danger.
C. The Water Board's Decision of 1940
Following Los Angeles' application for
appropriative rights permits in 1940, the Water
Board held hearings at which interested parties asserted their belief that the appropriations would lower the surface level and harm
various commercial and recreational uses of
Mono Lake. 49 The principal authority by which

the Water Board could deny Los Angeles' perExceedingly wet winters from 1982-1984 gave the lake a moment
to rejuvenate, raising the lake level to 6,379 feet above sea level,
still 38 feet lower than in 1941. Lawrence, supra note 26.
43. Nat'l Audubon, 658 Pl2d at 716.
44. Id. at 714, 716.
45. id.
46. Id. at 716.
47. Id
48. Id.
at 714.
49. Id. at 713.
50. Id. (citing Stats. 1921, ch. 329, § 1, p. 443 (codified as
CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (West 1971)). The California Supreme

mit application was a 1921 amendment to the
Water Commission Act of 1913, allowing the
Water Board to deny a permit "when in its
judgment the proposed appropriation would
not best conserve the public interest. ''50 The
1921 amendment also "declared to be the
established policy of this state that the use of
water for domestic purposes is the highest use
of water."'', The Water Board was to be directed
by this policy that domestic purposes was the
52
most important use of water.
Because DWP wanted to divert the water
for domestic purposes - for use by the population of Los Angeles - the Water Board granted
the application. The Water Board believed it
had no choice under the 1921 amendment,
regardless of the damage to the public trust
uses of Mono Lake.53 The Water Board made
note of its belief that it had no choice under
the law in its decision:
It is indeed unfortunate that the City's proposed development will result in decreasing
the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but
there is apparently nothing that this office can
do to prevent it. The use to which the City proposes to put the water under its Applications
is defined by the Water Commission Act as the
highest to which water may be applied and to
make available unappropriated water for this
use the City has . . . acquired the littoral and
riparian rights on Mono Lake and its tributaries
south of Mill Creek. This office therefore has no
alternative but to dismiss all protests based
upon the possible lowering of the water level in
Mono Lake and the effect the diversion of
water from these streams may have upon the

Court notes that this was not the only basis upon which the
Water Board could have rejected Los Angeles' permit application:
it could have done so on the theory that the stream waters were
already had a beneficial use or that DWP's proposal made an
unreasonable use of water, violating article X, section 2 of the
California Constitution. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714.
Unfortunately, a bitter battle transpired for over half a century
because the Water Board did not consider either of these theories upon which the permit could have been denied.
51. CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (West 1971).
52. Id.
53. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 713-14.
54. Division Water Resources Decision 7053, 7055, 8042 &
8043, at 26 (Apr. 11, 1940).
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aesthetic and recreational value of the Basin.54
The Water Board was mistaken in its belief.
in theory, the Board could have denied Los
Angeles' application on the basis of the previously discussed provision of the California
Constitution. In NationalAudubon, the California
Supreme Court noted that the Board could
have declared the feeder streams were already
put to beneficial use or that DWP suggested an
unreasonable use of the water, violating Article
X,§ 2 of the California Constitution. 5
The Water Board failed to reach a decision
in the 1940s that could have avoided both continued harm to Mono Lake's ecosystem and
continued conflict between Los Angeles and
environmentalists, which ultimately led to litigation. By the time the National Audubon litigation began, the Water Board had known for
approximately forty years that the diversions
would damage the aesthetic, ecological, and
recreational values of Mono Lake.
D. United States Supreme Court Decision
in Arizona v. California ( 963)
The United States Supreme Court ruled in
Arizona v. California that Arizona and Nevada were
entitled to three million acre feet of water from
the Colorado River, a significant source of water
for California. 56 In 1964, the Supreme Court limited California's allocations, 57 requiring California
to resort to other sources of water. This decision
led to the increased diversion from the Mono
Lake feeder streams in 1969, as DWP, California's
largest water user, increased its diversion to over
20,000 acre-feet per year.59 This new diversion

amount represented approximately seventeen
percent of Los Angeles' water supply.' By 1979,
the Mono Lake feeder streams supplied almost
twenty percent of Los Angeles' water.61

[ifigafion's Bounded Effetiveness and the Real Public Trust Docftine
As a result of increased diversions from the
Mono Basin following the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Arizona v. California, the level of
Mono Lake dropped rapidly. 62 The increased
diversions, making up for the loss of water
from the Colorado River, resulted in exposure
of the land bridge, which caught the attention
of environmentalists.
E. The Mono Lake Committee and
Environmental Activism
Environmentalists' concern for Mono Lake
ultimately resulted in "Save Mono Lake," a
public education campaign, which generated
thousands of bumper stickers and an unexpected "rise of the environmental ethic and the
force with which that ethic would be brought to
bear."63 However, the campaign's enthusiasm
and informed concern for Mono Lake began
with a small group of scientists and environmentalists who became alarmed about the
health of the lake and its ecosystem in the
1970s.
David Gaines, a Stanford-educated biologist, ornithologist, and ecologist spent a year
doing research at Mono Lake in 1975 in conjunction with his teaching job at the University
of California at Davis.6 4 In 1976 he quit his
Davis teaching job and spent the next two
years traveling throughout California, lecturing
to Sierra Club and National Audubon Society
chapters to stir interest in the damage done by
Los Angeles to the lake that he loved.6 5
In 1978, Gaines and his wife founded the
Mono Lake Committee with a small group of
people that were also passionate about the
lake.66 They set up Committee headquarters in
the small tourist town of Lee Vining, on the
eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park
and western shore of Mono Lake. 67 They sold t-

55. 658 P2d at 714.

62. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 706.

56. Ariz. v.Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963).

63. Koehler, supra note 17, at 564.

57. Ariz. v.Cal.,
376 U.S. 340 (1964).
58. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 705.

64. Mark Sauer, A Pall Falls on Mono Lake with Death of its
Protector, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 1988, at D-3.

59. Id.
at 705-06.

65. Id.

60. Id.
at 705.

66. Id.

61. See Brian E.Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law,

67 Id

45 HASTINGS L.J.
249, 263 (1994).
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shirts and distributed bumper stickers to residents of cities throughout the State, saying
"Save Mono Lake." 68 Gaines was pivotal in
bringing together various environmental
groups to file the National Audubon lawsuit
and creating national recognition of the Los
Angeles diversions.

69

F. Failed Proposals
Prior to filing the National Audubon lawsuit,
the Mono Lake Committee proposed a wet
year/dry year solution, allowing Los Angeles
diversions during dry years, but prohibiting
diversions in wet years when Los Angeles
could obtain water from other sources. 70 This
proposal likely failed for two reasons. First,
there were few scientific studies to support the
environmentalists' belief that further diversions would irreparably damage Mono Lake.
Much of what the environmentalists' suggested was considered conjecture. Second, the
Water Board's decision in the 1940s left DWP
with the impression that public interest groups
could not challenge Los Angeles' water rights.
The Mono Lake Committee and other
environmental groups' activism also initiated
creation of a State task force.7 ' In 1979, the task
force issued a scheme'for preserving the Mono
Basin natural resources. 72 However, Los
Angeles did not implement the task force's
plan, blaming high costs. 73 Failure of this plan
directly led to filing the National Audubon litigation.

III. The Mono Lake Litigation and
Landmark Decision
A.

Litigation
In 1979, the National Audubon Society, the
Mono Lake Committee, and other environmentalists who observed the negative impacts, particularly the rapid decline in the level of Mono
Lake, filed suit in Superior Court. They sought
to enjoin diversions by DWP on the theory that
the public trust doctrine protected the shores,
bed, and waters of Mono Lake.74 DWP filed a
motion for change of venue that was granted,
75
transferring the case to Alpine County.

In January 1980, DWP filed a cross complaint against over one hundred parties claiming water rights in the Mono Basin.76 The
United States, one of the cross defendants,
removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California in
February 1980.

77

Under the doctrine of federal abstention,78
the federal district court stayed its proceeding,
and asked the California Superior Court to
resolve two issues: whether there was a conflict
between the appropriative water rights system
and the public trust doctrine, and whether the
plaintiffs had to exhaust their administrative
remedies with the Water Board before filing
suit in court.79
Responding to the federal court's abstention order, the plaintiff environmentalists filed
a complaint for declaratory relief in the
Superior Court of Alpine County.8 0 In
November 1981, the Superior Court entered
summary judgment in favor of defendants on
both issues, finding that the public trust doctrine did not provide a basis for plaintiffs to

68. Id.

76. Id.

69. Id.

77. Id. at 716-17.

70. Id.
71. Koehler. supra note 17 at 564.
72. Id.
73.

WILLIAM. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER: THE CONFLICT OVER Los

ANGELES' WATER SUPPLY IN THE OWENS VALLEY 434-35 (1982).

74. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P2d at712.
75. Id. at 716.

78. Under the federal abstention doctrine, federal courts
exercise their discretion to not hear a case. In this case, for
instance, the doctrine allows the federal court to avoid deciding
a constitutional question by staying the proceedings to let the
state decide important questions of state law.
79. Id.at 712, 717.
80. Id.at 717.
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challenge the diversions and that they did not
exhaust the required administrative remedies.8 '
On the issue of the relationship between
the public trust and appropriative water rights
systems, the Superior Court found that the
public trust is not a system that functions independently of the appropriative water rights system.82 Further, the Superior Court found that
the "as regards the right of the City of Los
Angeles to divert waters in the Mono Basin
that the Public Trust Doctrine is subsumed in
the water rights system of the state."83 As for
the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
plaintiffs needed to challenge the Mono Lake
diversions under a public trust claim before the
Water Board or a claim that the appropriated
water was being put to an unreasonable or
non-beneficial use.84
Plaintiffs petitioned the California
Supreme Court for a writ of mandate to review
the Superior Court's decision.85 The California
Supreme Court agreed to review the Superior
Court's decision because of the significance of
the issues at stake.86
B. The California Supreme Court Decision in
National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court
1. Applicability of the Public Trust
Doctrine to Prior Appropriation
Water Rights
The California Supreme Court issued a
peremptory writ of mandate ordering the
Superior Court to vacate its judgment and
enter a new judgment consistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion.8 7 The Court stated
81. Id.
82. Id.at 718.
83. id.
84. Id.
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that the "core of the public trust doctrine is the
state's authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying those waters.8 According to the Court,
the State's sovereign authority applies to the
Mono Lake feeder streams and prohibits an
entity such as DWP or others from obtaining
vested rights where it is evident that interests
protected by public trust are harmed by the
diversions.8 9
In Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme
Court applied the public trust doctrine tideland and lakeshore waters, and determined
that the public trust protections include ecological and recreational values, not merely
commercial and transportation needs. 90 The
National Audubon Court adapted the Marks v.
Whitney holding to flowing bodies of water.91
The public trust doctrine therefore protects the
environmental values and ecologically vital
instream uses of waters subject to diversion.
Furthermore, the National Audubon Court held
that the public trust doctrine applies to nonnavigable waters, particularly Mono Lake's
feeder streams that are non-navigable, to the
extent that appropriations of non-navigable
waters harm navigable waters, in this case
92
Mono Lake itself.
The California Supreme Court noted that
the realities of California are such that the
State must have the power to allow water to be
diverted; the diversions are necessary to the
State's success and the ability of people to live
in a state with widespread areas characterized
by desert climate. 93 Therefore, the Court said
that the State must have the power to grant
appropriated water rights even where public

89. Id.
90. Marks v.Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). The
Marks case is most widely known for its extension of the public
trust "to encompass changing public needs." SAX ET AL., WATER
RESOURCES, supra note 11,at 536 (citing Marks, 491 P2d at 380).

85. id.

91. Nat'l
Audubon, 658 P.2d at 712.

86. id.

92. Id. at 721.

87. Id.at 732-33.
88. Id.at 713.

93. The Court noted such requirements were those not
linked to navigation, commerce, recreation, and ecology. Id. at
712.
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trust uses may be harmed.94 However, these
rights must be non-vested rights.95 In addition,
just because the rights can be granted does not
mean that they may be granted without first
considering the negative impacts on the public
trust uses.96 In the instant case, the Water
Board had declined to consider the public trust
impacts of DWP's water diversions when
approving DWP's appropriative rights.9 7
Because the Court believed lack of any
such consideration could result in wasteful
damage to the public trust uses, the Court stated "we believe that before the state courts and
agencies approve water diversions they should
consider the effect of such diversions upon
interests protected by the public trust, and
attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests. 98 Thus,
because no such consideration occurred, the
Court required a study of the Mono Basin water
rights and an assessment of the potential and
means to integrate the public trust doctrine
and the appropriative rights system. 99

2. The State's Powers and Duties as
Trustee
To arrive at its conclusion that at the heart of
the public trust doctrine is the State's authority
as sovereign to supervise and manage its navigable waters, the National Audubon Court traced the
history of public trust powers in California.'0 0 The
Court began by pointing out that in its review of
public trust law, the "dominant theme is the
state's sovereign power and duty to exercise continued supervision over the trust."'0 ' As a result,
any parties who acquire rights in public trust
property may not obtain a vested right and
acquire the property subject to the public trust.'02

Several significant cases set the doctrinal
foundation for the National Audubon Court's
extension of the public trust doctrine to the
appropriative water rights system. The United
States Supreme Court decision in Illinois Central
Railroad Company v. Illinois103 continues to be the
principal authority for public trust law, recently acknowledged as such by the California
Supreme Court in City of Berkeley v. Superior
Court.1 04

In 1886, the Illinois Legislature grant-

ed the railroad almost the entire Lake
Michigan waterfront in Chicago- 1,000 acres of
lands under water in fee simple.10 5 The Illinois
Legislature desired to revoke the grant legislatively a few years later. 10 6 The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld this revocation on the basis that
the lands under waters, which may be conveyed to private individuals to construct docks
and other structures that further public trust
purposes could be granted without being subject to the trust, but not all of the land could be
so conveyed, as was done here.' 0 7 The problem
with such a conveyance was that it would prohibit any future legislatures from defending the
public's interests.10 8 The Supreme Court
declared:
A grant of all the lands under the navigable
waters of a State has never been adjudged to
be within the legislative power; and any
attempted grant of the kind would be held, if
not absolutely void on its face, as subject to
revocation. The State can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people
are interested, like navigable waters and soils
under them ... than it can abdicate its police

powers in the administration of government
and the preservation of the peace. In the
administration of government the use of such
powers may for a limited period be delegated

94. Id.

102. id.

95. Id.

103. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).

96. Id.

104. 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980).

97. Id.

105. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453.

98. Id.

106. Id.

99. Id.

107. Id. at 460.

100. Id. at 719-21.

108. Id.

101.

Id. at 721.
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to a municipality or other body, but there
always remains with the State the right to
revoke those powers and exercise them in a
more direct manner, and one more conformable to its wishes. So with trusts connected with
public property, or property of a special character, like lands under navigable waterways,
they cannot be placed entirely beyond the
direction and control of the State.10 9
Thus, any grant of virtually all of the public
trust lands related to a waterway is by its
nature revocable by the State at any time."'
Although the grant is revocable by the
state at any time, expenses that may have been
incurred related to the improvements should
be paid for by the state."' Nonetheless, land
held in public trust may not be disposed of by
the legislature except in cases where such
grant actually improves the public interest in
the parcel or where such is done without detri12
ment to the lands subject to the trust.'
In 1913, the California Supreme Court first
applied the Illinois Central decision in People v.
California Fish Company. 1 3 In California Fish, under
statutory authority, state commissioners granted title to approximately 80,000 acres of tidelands to private owners. The California Supreme
Court enunciated that courts will carefully scrutinize a statute conveying public trust property
to the point where the conveyance equates to
an abandonment of the property; the court will
determine if the abandonment was the legislature's intent.' 4 The intent must be express or a
necessarily inferred from the language of the
statute." 5 If any reading of the statute does not
harm or destroy a public trust interest, the
statute should be given the non-destructive
6
interpretation by the courts."

Once the California Supreme Court applied
these guiding principles, it determined that the
grant was not made for purposes that benefited the public trust interests, and therefore, the
recipients did not own absolute title to the
property" 7 . The property was subject to easements for navigation and commerce by the
public. In addition the state possessed to
come on to the property and make any
improvements the State deemed necessary for
8
the advancement of the public good."
Therefore, the State did not reacquire the property; instead, the grantees retained the property subject to the public trust." 9
In Boone v. Kingsbury,120 decided in 1928, the
California Supreme Court had further occasion
to apply the public trust doctrine. The
California Legislature had given power to the
Surveyor-General to lease public trust lands to
drill for oil.' 2' Applying guidance provided in
Illinois Central, the California Supreme Court
sustained the statute on the basis that the
drilling derricks would not significantly impede
the public trust. 22 However, any licenses granted under the statute continued to be subject to
the trust, including the right of the State to
remove the structures at any time upon finding
123
of substantial interference with the trust.

12 4

Finally, in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,
the California Supreme Court considered
whether Board of Tidelands deeds, executed
under authorization by an 1870 act, transferred
title free of the public trust.125 Again, applying
guidance from the previous cases, the Court
held the grantees' title nevertheless remained
subject to the public trust. 26 The Court's reasoning was two-fold:, first the Legislature did

109. 111.
Cent., 146 U.S. at 453-54.

118. Id.

110. Id. at 455.

119. Id.

11.

Id.

120. 273 P. 797 (Cal. 1928).

112. Id. at 455-56.

121. Id. at 805.

113. 138 P.79 (Cal. 1913).

122. id. at 817.

114. ld- at 91.

123. Id.

115. Id. at 86.

124. 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980).

116. Id.
at 88.

125. Id. at 363.

117. Id. at 93-94.

126. Id. at 373.
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not clearly articulate its intention to permit
conveyances free of the public trust, and second, the 1870 act and the conveyances pur27
suant to it did not further trust purposes.
The National Audubon Court summarized all
of the previous cases to indicate the enduring
power of the State as manager of the public
trust. 28 The power even reaches to allow withdrawal of previously granted rights or the use
of the trust on lands believed unencumbered
by the trust. 29 The public trust is "more than
an affirmation of state power to use public
property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, [andl lakes
. . surrendering that right of protection . . .
only when the abandonment of that right is
consistent with the purposes of the trust."'3 °
Thus, the public trust doctrine was well established in California when the Mono Lake litigation made its way to the courts.
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Constitution provision that declares the water
policy for the State:
It is hereby declared that because of the
conditions prevailing in this State the general
welfare requires that the water resources of the
State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable, and that the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use of water be prevented, and that
the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and
for the public welfare. The right to water or to
the use or flow of water in or from any natural
stream or water course in this State is and shall
be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and
such right does not and shall not extend to the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use or unreasonable method of
diversion of water. 3 4

Therefore, all uses of

3. The California Water Rights System:
Limiting and Regulating Usufructuary
Interests
Following its discussion of the history of
public trust in California, the Supreme Court
proceeded to a discussion of the California
water rights system. The Court first noted that
California cases do not speak of water ownership; instead, they speak only of the right to use
water. 13 1 Likewise, Water Code § 102132 states,

water are inherently limited by a standard of
reasonable use.135
The constitutional amendment did not
enlarge Water Board's authority. Statutes and
case law, however, expanded the Water Board's
power gradually over time to watch over the reasonable use of water. 36 In 1955, the Legislature
stated that the Water Board was to consider the
benefits to be derived from beneficial uses of
water including instream uses like the preserva137
tion of fish and wildlife and recreational uses.

"IaIll water within the State is the property of
the people of the State, but the right to the use
of water may be acquired by appropriation in

The Water Board was further authorized by the
Legislature to make appropriations conditioned
upon requirements that best serve the public

the manner provided by law.' 33 In other words,
property rights in water appropriations are
usufructuary, not possessory, interests.
A significant defining feature of appropriation rights in National Audubon was the California

interest. 13 Subsequent Water Code provisions

similarly made reference to the public interest
and the Water Board's authorization to take the
public interest in consideration.

39

127. Id.

134. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.

128. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 723.

135. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 725.

129. Id.

136. Id. at 726.

130. ld. at 724.

137. Id.; CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971).

131. Id.

138. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 726.

132. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
133. Id.

139. Id. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1971); CAL. WATER
CODE § 1243.5 (West 1971).
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Case law likewise expanded the Water
Board's powers. One of the expanded powers
included the power to enjoin diversions by the
owner of a prescriptive right who would not
comply with conservation programs. 140
Another case declared the power of the Water
Board to grant an appropriation application a
quasi-judicial act. 14 1 Thus, implicitly by the
California Constitution's limits on water rights,
and explicitly by legal standards advanced by
statutes and case law, the Water Board has
obtained the duty to comprehensively plan
and

allocate

the

State's

waters.

42

The

California Supreme Court stated that this progression affects the Water Board's public trust
responsibilities.143 The Water Board has the

power and function to balance public trust
principles with appropriative rights, and to
effectuate the public trust doctrine's values by
regulating water rights.
4. Integration of the Two Systems
The public trust and appropriative rights
systems each developed separately from the
other with their own set of rules. The California
Supreme Court declared itself unable to
choose either position that subscribed to only
one system or the other. 144 The Court stated
"[iln our opinion, both the public trust doctrine
and the water rights system embody important
precepts which make the law more responsive
to the diverse needs and interests involved in
the planning and allocation of water resources.
To embrace one system of thought and reject
the other would lead to an unbalanced structure.' 4 5
With these perspectives as a foundation,
the Court reached three conclusions. First, the
State as sovereign must manage its navigable
140. See People v.Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1980); Envt'l
Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist.. 605 P2d I (Cal.
1980).
141. See Temescal Water Co. v. Dep't. Pub. Works, 280 P.2d I
(Cal. 1955).
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46
waters and the lands lying underneath.
Second, reality dictates that the Legislature or
an authorized administrative body must have
the power to grant licenses that allow an
appropriator to use water even though such
use may harm public trust uses. " 4 7 Third, the
power to grant such licenses is conditioned on
the positive duty of the State to consider the
public trust in planning and allocation of water
resources and to protect public trust uses
whenever possible.

48

In National Audubon, the

Court ruled that the State - and more specifically, the Water Board - had not fulfilled its
obligation contained in the Supreme Court's
third conclusion: the duty of the State to consider the public trust in water allocation.
Therefore, the Court declared the
California system of water rights an integration
of both the public trust doctrine and appropriative rights.

49

The Court stated that the

plaintiffs could rely upon the public trust doctrine to request re-evaluation of the Mono
Basin allocations.

50

5. Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies With the Water Board
The California Supreme Court next considered the second issue presented: whether the
environmental plaintiffs were required first to
exhaust their administrative remedies with the
Water Board before seeking relief in court. 151
The Court acknowledged the experience and
proficiency of the Water Board for appropriative rights and public trust use issues, supporting a grant of primary jurisdiction to the Water
Board.152 However, the Court also noted that

under California precedent, the courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Water Board
for water rights disputes.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 728.
149. Id. at 732.

142. Nat'l
Audubon, 658 P2d at 726.

150. Id.

143. Id.

151. Id. at 729.

144. Id.
at 727.

152. Id. at 713.

145. Id.

153. id.

53
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Furthermore, the California Legislature
acknowledged such concurrent jurisdiction by
implication by creating a system where the
courts can ask the Water Board to act as referee of water rights controversies. 54 Because of
this procedural grant by the Legislature, the
National Audubon Court held that courts may
carry on using their concurrent jurisdiction.
However, they should also not hesitate to ask
the Water Board to referee cases where their
particular knowledge would be especially help55
ful in resolving the conflict.
Because the courts and the Water Board
possessed concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter, the Court did not require the plaintiffs
56
to exhaust their administrative remedies.
However, the key to the eventual success of the
public trust doctrine and its use by environmentalists to reduce diversions from the Mono
Basin lies in the final words of the Court's opinion "we do not dictate any particular allocation
of water."' 157 This task was left for the Water
Board.
IV. The Aftermath of National Audubon
A. The Supreme Court Decision: A Clever
Catalyst for Compromise
The California Supreme Court did not mandate any particular water allocations in its
National Audubon decision. The Court declared
that the mere clarification of water rights in
California was the first move forward in the
ultimate solution for the Mono Basin dispute. 118 Resolving the legal issues was the
Court's primary objective. 5 9 The Court hoped
"by integrating these two doctrines . . . [it

wouldl clear away the legal barriers which have
so far prevented either the Water Board or the
courts from taking a new and objective look at
the water resources of the Mono Basin.' 6 0
Thus, the Court communicated to the par-
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ties involved that they had the responsibility to
seek creative and novel ways to solve the problem. The Court essentially acknowledged that
the parties with such important interests at
stake - on one hand the water supply for the
City of Los Angeles, and on the other, the aesthetic and ecological preservation of an important water resource - were in the best position
to come up with a solution. Courts are ill-suited by function, process, and expertise to
achieve win-win compromises to conflicts having important non-legal dimensions. Removal
of the legal barriers catalyzed the move from
conflict to cooperation. Eventually, the parties
reached a cooperative solution to the problem,
but not until the conflict persisted for ten years
after the NationalAudubon decision.
B. Continuing Litigation: The Feeder
Streams Litigation
Following the National Audubon decision,
environmental groups pursued a number of
lawsuits with the dual purposes of water level
and ecosystem preservation. This time they
used a strategy assisted by a natural phenomenon. During wet winters in the 1980s, the
dams overflowed and allowed previously
absent trout to enter the Mono Lake feeder
streams. The trout became the object of litigation to ensure continuing adequate water levels in the streams and therefore reduced diversions.
The litigation was brought under provisions of the California Fish and Game Code
rather than the public trust doctrine. Section
5946 of the Fish and Game Code states that no
water appropriation permit or license can be
issued in either Mono or Inyo counties after
September 8, 1953, unless the applicants comply with Fish and Game Code § 5937, adopted
by a 1937 statute. 161Section 5937 requires dam
operators to allow enough water to flow
through, around, or over the dam to maintain
the fish below the dam.1 62 Los Angeles com-

154. Id.

159. Id.

155. Id.

160. Id.

156. id.

161. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5937, 5946 (West 1998).

157. Id at 732.

162. id.

158. Id.
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menced diversions of water from the Mono
Basin in 1941 under an earlier-issued permit.
However, DWP did not obtain licenses for the
diversion facilities until 1974.163
Between 1984 and 1986, environmental
groups, including the Mono Lake Committee,
the National Audubon Society, and California
Trout, Inc, filed four lawsuits under Sections
5937 and 5946 concerning the instream flows
of Rush, Lee Vining, Walker, and Parker Creeks,
which are four of the five Mono Lake tributaries. 164 The plaintiffs contended that the Water
Board, in issuing licenses to DWP in 1974, violated State laws requiring maintenance of minimum flows to protect the fish populations in
the streams.
In 1984, the Mono County Superior Court
issued a temporary restraining order requiring
DWP to release 9 cubic feet per second (cfs) of
water into Rush Creek, which became a preliminary injunction in 1985. In 1986, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order compelling the release of 10 cfs into Lee Vining
Creek, which was modified to become a 1987
preliminary injunction compelling a release of
about 4 cfs.
In one of the lawsuits, CaliforniaTrout, Inc. v.
165
Superior Court (hereinafter "California Trout I"),

the Sacramento County Superior Court denied
the environmental groups' petitions for writs of
mandate to compel the Water Board to rescind
DWP's licenses under the Fish and Game Code
provisions.166 The California Court of Appeal,
Third District, reversed the trial court.1 67 The
appellate court held that the Water Board was
required to apply Sections 5937 and 5946 and,
in so doing, modify DWP's licenses to ensure
minimum stream flows to support fish populations.1 68 The court rejected arguments that
163. L.A. Wins Battle Over Mono Water, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Aug. 6, 1986, at WL 3752964.
164. The facts concerning this feeder stream litigation
throughout this subsection come from three sources: LI7LEWORTH
& GARNER, supra note 36, at 98-102; Crabbe, supra note 1; and
Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Political and Legal Chronology, at
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/polchr.htm
(last
visited Oct. 8, 2001).
165. Cal. Trout v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 255
Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (Cal. Trout I).
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DWP had vested water rights to which the Fish
and Game Code provisions had been improperly applied retroactively and that fishery uses
could not be favored over domestic uses. 69
On remand, the Superior Court mandated
that DWP stabilize stream flows to maintain
the fisheries, but allowed the Water Board
three years to comply until it had completed
environmental studies. The Superior Court
denied interim relief to the environmentalists.
On appeal ("California Trout ll",)17 ° , the
California Court of Appeal again reversed the
trial court, directed the court to set interim
flow releases for the four streams tributary to
Mono Lake, and directed the Water Board to
impose immediate conditions on DWP's
1
licenses to comply with California Trout 1. 71
In essence, the successful curtailment of
diversions that resulted from this litigation
marked another shocking victory for the environmental groups. Another victory helped to
lessen the perceived strength of DWP's position. Again, DWP's position had been created,
at least in part, by the Water Board's mistaken
belief that it was powerless to limit the diversions.
C. Mono Lake Committee Activism and
Endurance
The environmentalists' persistent activism
and efforts at both public education and problem solving were at least as critical to their success at saving Mono Lake as their legal victories were. The Mono Lake Committee, under
the leadership of David Gaines, gradually came
to exercise significant influence not only over
the use of water in the Mono Basin but also
over water usage in Southern California generally.172 Gaines was pivotal in gaining state

166. Id. at 186.
167. Id. at 187, 213.
168. Id. at 191-98, 209-13.
169. Id. at 198-209.
170. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 793
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (Cal. Trout II).
171. Id. at 802-04.
172. Sauer, supra note 64.
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reserve and national forest scenic area designation for the shore area surrounding Mono
Lake in the early 1980s and national recognition of the Los Angeles diversions.'73
The Committee achieved public recognition of the Mono Lake problem primarily
through the "Save Mono Lake" campaign. The
campaign generated thousands of bumper
stickers with the slogans "Save Mono Lake,"
"Long Live Mono Lake," "I Save Water For
Mono Lake," "Restore Mono Lake," and "Mono

the growing demand for water in Southern
California, out of concern that reduced diversions from Mono Lake merely would be
replaced by harmful diversions from another
equally important water basin.
At first, DWP tried to ignore the Mono Lake
Committee with its highly educated leaders,
graduate students, summer interns, and other
activists. 180 Just a month before Gaines' death,
in December 1987, DWP finally agreed to work
with the Mono Lake Committee to reach a

Lake: It's For the Birds.', 174 This public educa-

long-term preservation solution.181 Beginning

tion campaign included an information center
and bookstore in Lee Vining, California, interpretive tours at Mono Lake, publications and a
website, information presentations and slide
shows for various groups, and both at-school
and outdoor informational programs for Los
Angeles area youth and children. 75
The public education campaign generated
an unexpected "rise of the environmental ethic
and the force with which that ethic would be

in 1989, city officials publicly began to
acknowledge the group's strength and victories. 182 DWP's assistant general manager at
that time, Duane Georgeson, said "they have
been a well-organized, effective group for a

brought to bear.'

76

The Committee gained

more than 20,000 members.

77

Significantly,

the public education campaign had a substantial impact on the attitudes of Southern
California residents, the consumers of water
diverted from the Mono Lake tributaries.
Tragically, in January 1988, both Gaines and
his assistant were killed in a car accident five
years after the California Supreme Court decision in National Audubon.' 78 His successor,
Martha Davis - a Stanford graduate with a
master's degree in forest science from Yale proved to be a major force, continuing the work
of the Committee's founder. 7 9 The Committee
devoted attention not only to saving Mono
Lake but also to seeking creative solutions to
173. Id.
174.

Water Diversions at Mono Lake, at http://www.liv-

inglakes.organization/mono/diversions. htm.
175. Id.
176. Koehler, supra note 17, at 564.
177. Water Diversions at Mono Lake, supra note 174.
178. Sauer, supra note 64.
179. Kevin Roderick, Selling a Lake; Tenacious Mono Backers Use
SophisticatedTactics to Beat DWP to its Knees, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept.
24, 1989, at 3.

16

long time ... [t]hey've done a pretty good job
183
mobilizing public opinion.'

D.

Refraining and Negotiation
For a long time, "DWP portrayed the fight
as 'win-lose' - if Mono Lake won, L.A. would
lose."' 184 In May 1991 Martha Davis, executive
director of the Mono Lake Committee, perceived that this attitude was changing. She
believed a compromise could be reached that
would make certain Los Angeles receives water
185
it requires, while Mono Lake is preserved.
The Mono Lake Committee wisely acknowledged early in the conflict that it would not be
effective to argue whether Los Angeles had the
rights to the water.186 The Committee instead
focused on ways to achieve Mono Lake protection and protection of other water sources,
while finding ways to address Southern
87

California's water needs.1

180. Id.
181, Sauer, supra note 64.
182, Roderick, supra note 179.
183, Id.
184. Dan Morain, Mono Lake Supporters Raise Wineglasses to
Toast a Victory Over L.A., Los ANGELES TIMES, May 12, 1991, at A27.
185. Id.
186. Roderick, supra note 179.
187. id.
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The previously discussed factors had a significant impact in moving the parties toward
cooperation because they each chipped away
at the strength of DWP's position. DWP previously seemed to have a stranglehold on the
water rights, with other interested parties left
without legal recourse. DWP appeared to have
underestimated the potential for a loss in
National Audubon on the issue of whether the
public trust doctrine applies to "well-settled"
appropriative rights or the likelihood that the
California Supreme Court would fashion a
decision requiring negotiation and compromise. According to a well-informed Mono
Basin water controversy follower, the National
Audubon decision shocked many people including lawyers and water management person88

nel.1

DWP also failed to consider that the environmentalists would pursue other creative
avenues of litigation - the feeder stream cases.
Not only did the environmentalists pursue creative legal claims, but their claims were effective. The sheer activism and endurance by the
Mono Lake Committee also played a significant role. Perhaps most surprising of all, the
environmentalists greatly influenced public
opinion, including the attitudes of DWP's customer, towards protecting Mono Lake.
A significant factor in motivating Los
Angeles to consider conservation measures
was a drought beginning in 1986.189 Another
important factor in moving the parties toward
cooperation was 1989 state legislation that
conditionally set aside sixty million dollars to
help pay for a substitute supply of water for
Los Angeles. 90 The legislation provided an
incentive for cooperation. To qualify for the
funds, Los Angeles was required to reach
agreement with the Mono Lake Committee
188. Douglas L.Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Some Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIz. ST. L.I. 423, 457

(1995).
189.

STEPHEN A. THOMPSON. WATER USE, MANAGEMENT, AND
PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES 198 (1999).

190. Environmental Water Act of 1989, Cal. Water Code §§
12,929 et seq; see also Roderick, supra note 179.
191.

Id.

192. 43 U.S.C. § 390h- I; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 102-1016, at

concerning the

source of the

substitute

9

water.' ' The legislation reflected the environmentalists' concerns about protecting other
watersheds from excessive diversions that
might substitute for the reductions in diversions
from
Mono
Lake's
tributaries.
Furthermore, in 1992, Congress authorized federal funds for reclamation of 120,000 acre-feet
of water to offset reduced diversions from
92
Mono Lake. 1
The available funding did not bring the
parties into agreement quickly, however. The
parties did not reach agreement until four
years after the legislation was enacted.
California Assemblyman Phillip lsenberg, a
Democrat from Sacramento who co-authored
the legislation, was quoted as saying "IfIrankly,
I never expected it to take so long to give away
this money.' ' 93 To help make the compromise
happen, Governor Pete Wilson promised that
the State of California would match twenty million dollars in funds beginning in the 199494
1995 fiscal year.
Cooperation finally occurred after Los
Angeles Councilwoman Ruth Galanter brokered the negotiations. 95
described the negotiations
paranoia by two groups that
were openly hostile toward

Ms. Galanter
as overcoming
distrusted and
96
one another.

Additionally, Los Angeles Mayor Richard
Riordan replaced four DWP commissioners
with new appointees that were eager to leave
the past behind and cooperate., 97 Thus, in
addition to the other previously discussed factors, the passage of time and new faces at the
negotiation table were important to a resolution of the conflict.
In December 1993, the parties finally
reached agreement. Martha Davis, the
183, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4041.
193. Maria Cone, DWP Agrees to Take Less Mono Lake Water
Resources: City Plans to Make Up Loss in Reclamation Effort, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at WL 2242416.
194. Id.
195. Id.

196. Id.
197. Id.
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Executive Director of the Mono Lake
Committee called the agreement "the political
equivalent of the Camp David accord." 98 The
City of Los Angeles agreed to erect a fifty million dollar water reclamation plant, eliminating the need for almost one-half of the water
normally withdrawn from the Mono Lake feeder streams. 99 This agreement marked the first
time that Los Angeles voluntarily relinquished
any of its water rights in favor of an alternate
source. 200 In 1997, the representatives of both
DWP and the National Audubon Society signed
a memorandum agreement for the construction of the water reclamation plant in the San
Fernando Valley with an eventual capacity to
recycle 35,000 acre-feet of water.20 '
E. Water Board Decision 1631 (1994)
The agreement reached by DWP and the
environmentalists facilitated a decision by the
Water Board concerning the amount of water
that DWP is entitled to divert from the Mono
Basin. The decision was made eleven years after
the California Supreme Court directed the
Board to balance the public trust with DWP's
water rights and determine the diversions permitted. Following forty-four days of hearings
before the Water Board, the Board - by unanimous vote - required Los Angeles to significantly reduce diversions from the Mono Basin
to no more than 12,000 acre-feet per year, graduated over time, until the Mono Lake water level
rises sixteen feet.20 2 The Water Board decision 0 3
allows an increase in diversions to 25,000 acrefeet per year once the water level rises by sixteen feet- a level that both sides predict will take
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between twenty-five and thirty years to occur.
The Water Board established minimum
flow rates for each feeder stream for various
yearly precipitation scenarios. 205 The Water
Board
relied primarily on California
Department of Fish and Game recommendations for the flow rates.20 6 The Water Board
concluded that these feeder stream flows
would cause Mono Lake to rise to roughly
6,390 feet. However, to comply with federal air
quality standards, the Water Board set the
required average lake level at 6,392 feet 2 7 to
reduce the blowing of particulates.2 °8 This level
was also chosen to protect public trust
resources including the California gull and
other migratory birds' nesting habitats, brine
shrimp productivity, public access to the lake's
tufta towers, compliance with water quality
standards, and enhancement of the aesthetic
values of the lake. 20 9 The graduated diversion

system was created to meet the average lake
level.
Furthermore, the Water Board supplemented Decision 1631 with an order in 1998 establishing stream and waterfowl habitat restoration plans pursuant to the parties' agreement. 210 This 1998 order is designed to effectu-

ate Decision 1631 with ecosystem restoration
and monitoring measures, and effectively ends
the courts' jurisdiction over the Mono Lake
controversy.
Decision 1631 ended the fifteen-year battle
the environmental groups launched to stop the
negative impacts on Mono Lake when DWP
indicated it would not appeal the Water
Board's

198. Id.
199. Catherine O'Brien, L.A. Agrees to Project to Restore Mono
Lake, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Dec. 14, 1993, at WL 8314493.
200. Cone, supra note 193.
201. Id.
202. Eric Brazil, Environmentalists Hail Ruling On Mono Lake
Water Use: L.A. Won't Appeal Decision Cutting Draw, SAN FRANcisco
EXAMINER, Sept. 28, 1994, at WL 4267972.
203. In the Matter of Amendment of the City of Los Angeles'
Water Right Licenses for Diversion of Water From Streams
Tributary to Mono Lake City of Los Angeles, Licensee (Cal. St.
Wat. Res. Conrol Bd. Sept. 28, 1994) (Decision 1631).
204. Brazil, supra note 202.

decision. 21

Both

the

National

205. Decision 1631 at 33, 41-42, 48-49, 69.
206. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 717.
207. Decision 1631 at 154.
208. Decision 1631 at 132, 154.
209. Decision 1631 at 77-154.
210. In the Matter of Stream and Waterfowl Habitat
Restoration Plans and Grant Lake Operations and Management
Plan Submitted by the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power Pursuant to the Requirements of Water Right Decision
1631, Order WR 98-05 (Cal. St. Wat. Res. Control Bd. Sept. 2,
1998).
211. Brazil, supra note 202.
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Audubon Society and the Mono Lake
Committee were extremely pleased by the
Water Board's decision. The National Audubon
Society described the decision as "an environmental victory of lifetime proportionS ''212 and
the Mono Lake Committee described it as "the
breakthrough environmental decision on
water," protecting Mono Lake and prompting
Los Angeles to find local sources to replace the
distant diversions.

2 3
1

F.Reclamation and Conservation Efforts
An important aspect of the compromise
between DWP and the environmentalists was a
major reclamation and conservation program.
The program is designed to replace reduced
diversions from Mono Lake with reduced
demand for water appropriations, instead of
diversions from other water bodies that would
harm the ecosystems and public trust values
associated with those water bodies.
In June 1990, the Los Angeles City Council
approved a recycling goal of forty percent of
Los Angeles' wastewater by 2010.214 The East
Valley Water Recycling Project will begin distributing water to spreading grounds in Los
Angeles which will in turn, within five years,
pass through into groundwater basins in the
city. 2t 5 This is DWP's biggest water recycling

project and will eventually meet almost half of
Los Angeles' 2010 recycling goal.2t 6 An added
benefit to this project is that it will also serve
irrigation and industrial customers that lie
along the route of the Recycling Project
pipeline.2t 7 According to the Mono Lake
Committee, the capacity to recycle 35,000 acre212. Id.
213. Id.
214. City of Los Angeles Water Services, City of Los Angeles
Water Services: Water Recycling, at http://www.ladwp.com/water/supply/recycle/index.htm.
215. Frances Spivy-Weber, There Is No New Water at,
http://www.monolake.org/socalwater/nonewwater.htm.
216. City of Los Angeles Water Services, City of Los Angeles
Water Services: Water Recycling at http://www.ladwp.com/water/supply/recycle/index.htm.
217. Id.
218. id.

feet of water per year is enough to support
200,000 families per year, helping to offset
some of the 78,000 acre-feet reduction in Mono
Lake diversions required by the Water Board.21
Recent conservation, including the efforts
by Los Angeles residents, have allowed the
existing Los Angeles water supply stretch further. In fact, even though an additional one
million people moved into Los Angeles
between 1975 and 1995, the City's water usage
did not change." 9 Other projects including the
West Basin and East Valley reclamation facilities, other reclamation sources, and other conservation efforts are expected to recycle
141,250 acre-feet per year.220 In addition, the
California Urban Water Conservation Council
has developed a list of water conservation
"Best Management Practices" expected to save
700,000 acre-feet of water annually in Southern
California .221
DWP has undertaken numerous other
aggressive conservation strategies. To encourage conservation, Los Angeles' water rates are
about twenty percent higher during the sum222

mer - a high water use season.
DWP also
provides Los Angeles residents with water conservation tools. For example, a Los Angeles
resident may request free water conservation
kits that include low-flow showerheads, water
displacement bags for toilets, and dye tablets
to help detect water leaks.223 A Los Angeles
resident may also receive up to one hundred
fifty dollars in rebates from DWP for purchasing
and installing a high-efficiency washing
machine. 224 Similarly, DWP's Ultra-Low-Flush
toilet rebate program provide a Los Angeles
219. Replacement Water: Helping Los Angeles Find Other Solutions,
at http://www.monolake org/socalwater/altwater.htm.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power,
Water Conservation, at http://web.ladwp.com/-wsoweb/Aqueduct/
historyoflaa/conservation.htm
223. Id.
224. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power,
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power High-Efficiency Clothes Washer
Rebate Program, at http://www.ladwp.com/water/conserv/
washers/index.htm.
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resident up to one hundred dollars for replacing a regular toilet.

225

The most important facet of these reclamation and conservation programs is that the programs do not draw new water from other
sources. The programs reuse, recycle, and conserve used water. This is a major achievement
for the environmentalists. Not only did they
achieve preservation of the aesthetic and ecological values of Mono Lake, but the City of Los
Angeles did not turn to and damage another
water source in the State.
G. Progress
Although it is too soon to make a definitive
evaluation of the Mono Lake agreement's
effectiveness, there are promising developments in three areas that suggest the outcome
of this conflict has had benefits. First, the level
of Mono Lake has risen. As of October 1, 2001,
Mono Lake was at 6,382.8 feet above sea level,
which was a gain of 8.2 feet since the Water
Board's Decision 1631 in

1994. 22'

Although the

lake level experienced some decreases in 2000
and 2001 despite near normal runoffs, higher
than normal runoff between 1995 and 1999 has
put the lake level ahead of its schedule under
normal runoff conditions to reach the target of
6,391 feet by 2021 (26 years after Decision
1631).

227

Furthermore, there have been increas-

es in water flows in the four creeks that were
subject to the litigation, judicial decisions, and
Water Board orders, and efforts are underway
to restore stream channels and flows, and
riparian habitats and ecosystems, despite the
presence of damage from over forty years of
excessive diversions.228
Second, Southern Californians have
changed their water usage practices. The con225. City of Los Angeles Department of water and Power,
City of Los Angeles Water Services Ultra-Low-Flush Toilet Rebate Program,
at http://www.ladwp.com/water/conserv/toilet/index htm.
226. Current Lake Level: Tracking the Progress of a Rising Lake, at
http://www.monolake.org/live/level.htm
227. Reasonable Further Progress Report for the Mono
Basin PM-10 State Implementation Plan 2 & Fig. 2 (Sept. 2001).
228. Mono Basin Creeks: Rush, Parker,Walker, Lee Vining, Mill, at
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/streams.htm.

ubr

servation and reclamation programs described
above have had an impact. In 1998, the
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) service
area, which covers a significant portion of
Southern California including Los Angeles
(DWP), used the same amount of water as it
had in 1983, fifteen years earlier, despite a population growth of about 30 percent.22 9 Indeed,
MWD's water sales dropped from 2.6 million
acre-feet of water in 1990 to 1.5 million acrefeet of water in 1993.230 Perhaps even more sig-

nificantly, MWD and DWP are engaged in an
effort to stabilize their supplies of water and
become drought-resistant by pursuing five
strategies: 1) conservation, which reduced the
usage of water per person or per unit of economic activity; 2) reclamation, which reuses
water; 3) storage, which places water in reservoirs when it is readily available for use when it
is more scarce; 4) groundwater replenishment
and storage programs; and 5) purchases of
available water supplies in water markets. 231 It

would appear that Southern California water
agencies are responding to the potential
uncertainty to water supplies posed not only
by drought but also by litigation and judicial
and administrative decisions limiting water
rights to protect the environment. The Mono
Lake conflict has contributed to a shift in
Southern California water policy from rightsbased approaches to management-based
approaches.
Third, the Mono Lake Committee and other
environmental groups have become active in
other water law and policy issues. For example,
the Committee works with Los Angeles area
government and citizen groups on conservation ideas and policies as part of the Los
Angeles Conservation Council. The Committee
also has promoted state bonds for parks and
water, become involved in negotiations over
229. Martha Davis, Stepping Outside the Box: Water in Southern
California, at http://www.monolake.org/waterpolicy/outsidebox.
htm.
230. Id.
231. See the following documents: Integrated Resources Plan;
Water for Sale; Groundwater Boosts Local Supply; and Dividing the Water:
A
Colorado Plan That
Ensures
California's Future, at
http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/Docs/WaterReliability.htm.
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the use and quality of water in the San
Francisco Bay Delta, and lobbied for Federal
232
ultra-low flush toilet regulations.
V. Making the Public Trust Doctrine
Effective: The Real Public Trust
Commentators have described the public
trust doctrine as a powerful and effective constraint on degradation of natural resources and
their associated ecosystems.

233

In particular,

National Audubon has been regarded as one of
the most important environmental law cases of
the twentieth century because the California
Supreme Court applied a common law principle as an inherent, albeit undelineated, limit
on property rights that harm the environment.234 Other commentators have questioned
the effectiveness of the public trust doctrine
and other common law principles to achieve
environmental protection or resolve conflicts
between the economically productive use of
natural resources and the protection of their
ecological, aesthetic, and other non-commercial values. 235 These commentators favor either

regulation or market forces, instead of judicial
oversight.
As this case study demonstrates, questions
about the effectiveness of judicial decisions
applying the public trust doctrine involve
greater subtlety and nuance than might first
appear. We might refer to the impact of judicial
decisions and legal doctrine as "bounded
effectiveness. ',236 In general, judicial decisions
like National Audubon and doctrinal rules about
the integration of the public trust doctrine with
prior appropriation water rights systems are
232. See http://www.monolake.org/waterpolicy.index.htm.
233. See, e.g., Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22;Harrison C.
Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property
Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515 (1989); Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust
Protection For Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 233
(1980); Koehler, supra note 17; Sax, Public Trust, supra note 3;Ian S.
Stevens, The Public Trust and Instream Uses, 19 ENVTL. L. 605 (1989).
234. See Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 704.
235. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist
View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection and
Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV.
1209 (1991): James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A

necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve the values behind the public trust. Non-litigation
strategies are required to make the public trust
effective in practice.
This "bounded effectiveness" is evident in
both the Mono Lake litigation itself and the
aftermath of National Audubon. In National
Audubon, the California Supreme Court accomplished only three things. 237 First, the Court
resolved the legal issues presented to it, namely whether the public trust doctrine requires
the elimination of recognized appropriative
water rights that adversely affect navigable
waters and if so, to what extent, and also
whether the plaintiffs in the case had exhausted their administrative remedies or were
required to do so. Second, the Court established both the legal authority and the legal
duty of the Water Board to balance public trust
values with appropriative water rights in all circumstances in which both legal interests might
be implicated, as well as the power of the
courts to enforce this obligation in future
cases. Third, the Court issued a writ of mandate compelling the Water Board to redetermine DWP's entitlements to water diversions
by considering and balancing both the public
trust doctrine and DWP's previously authorized
water rights.
The National Audubon Court did not, however, establish the amount of water that DWP was
entitled to divert from Mono Lake's tributaries.
The Court did not resolve the conflict between
Los Angeles and environmentalists, which persisted for ten years after the landmark decision
was handed down. The Court did not identify
any of the specific features of the compromise
that ultimately solved the Mono Lake problem,

Comment on the Public Trust Writing of Professors Sax, Wilkinson,
Dunning, and Johnson, 63 DENy. U. L. REV.565 (1986); Lazarus, supra
note 3; Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical
Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15
STAN. ENVrL. L. J. 3, 38-40 (1996); Paul R. Williams & Stephen I.
McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The Next Step in
Protecting California's Instream Values, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.I. 132 (1990).
236. With apologies to behavioral economics, we borrow
from the terms "bounded rationality," "bounded willpower," and
"bounded self-interest" to create the term "bounded effectiveness." See Christine lolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
237. See Part 11,supra.
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like reclamation and conservation, public education, and state funding. Furthermore, with
respect to future conflicts between public trust
values and appropriative water rights in other
water systems, the Court did not establish
bright-line rules for either courts or the Water
Board to apply.2 38 Nor did the Court give either
environmentalists or water appropriators
much basis for evaluating the likelihood of
winning or losing in subsequent public trust
litigation. In short, the Court articulated only
general principles, the specific meaning, content, and effectiveness of which would be
determined in other forums and by non-judicial actors.
We contend, therefore, that the "real" public trust doctrine is defined by parties' and
decision makers' non-litigation actions in light
of judicially-determined general principles. If
the parties to the Mono Lake dispute had not
reached an acceptable solution, the public
trust doctrine might have come to mean very
little in the context of water rights. Of course,
the environmental groups could have persisted
with litigation to enforce the National Audubon
decision and force the Water Board to reduce
DWP's legally permitted diversions. However,
during continued conflict and non-resolution,
further harm to the lake could have occurred
while diversions continued. In addition, DWP
could have found a replacement source of
water to appropriate from another watershed,
causing harm to bodies of water and their
related ecosystems elsewhere. Further public
trust litigation might have been needed to prevent such a replacement strategy or, more likely, to stop such replacement diversions after
enough evidence of their harm could be gathered.
Perhaps more seriously, a completely
rights-based "solution" limiting DWP's rights to
water appropriations generally in favor of the

public trust might have generated political
forces and public pressures that would have
weakened the public trust doctrine altogether.239 It is not inconceivable that a large, thirsty
Southern California electorate could have used
the initiative process to pass a constitutional
amendment limiting the public trust doctrine's
applicability to water rights. 240 Likewise, courts
and the Water Board might have weakened the
application of the public trust doctrine to water
rights in subsequent cases if the early disputes
had not reached pragmatic solutions acceptable to the primary parties in interest.
We do not contend that either the public
trust doctrine as a legal theory or litigation
under the public trust doctrine is unimportant
or unnecessary. Both the public trust litigation
and the feeder stream litigation under the
California Fish and Game Code played four
critical roles. First, DWP's losses upset its
expectations that it had the right to use water
without limits, therefore eventually bringing
DWP to the bargaining table with the environmentalists. Second, the outcomes in both sets
of cases shifted the relative bargaining power
of the two parties towards greater power - both
legally and psychologically - for the environmentalists than they had prior to the decisions. Third, the Water Board, for all practical
purposes, "gained" authority and duty to consider environmental factors and public trust
values in evaluating new and existing water
rights generally, because the Court disabused
the Board of its assumption that it had no such
authority or duty.2 4' Finally, other water users
are likely to reevaluate their positions and
rethink conflicts and potential conflicts they
may have with environmental interests over
minimum instream flows, in light of the outcomes of National Audubon and the feeder
stream litigation.24 2 In short, it was essential to

238. See Thomas, supra note 235, at 38-40; Williams &
McHugh, supra note 235, at 155.

Trust: Text, Near-Text, and Context, 27 ARIz. ST L.J. 1155 (1995).

239. See Williams & McHugh, supra note 235, at 158.
240. Id.
241. For a discussion of the impact of National Audubon on
subsequent cases and Water Board determinations and an argument that the Water Board has given effect to public trust principles in its decisions, see Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public

242. Parties to subsequent disputes over the environmental impacts of water diversions may "bargain in the shadow of the
law" created by the National Audubon decision. See Robert Cooter
et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, II I. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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have a judicial decision on the applicability of
the public trust doctrine to water rights in
order to have an "aftermath" to effectuate the
doctrine.
Nonetheless, several non-litigation elements of the aftermath of National Audubon
turned what could have been a doctrinally
astonishing but practically ineffective judicial
decision into effective protection for the Mono
Lake ecosystem, as well as a model for subsequent conflicts between the public trust and
appropriative rights. One of these elements
was the ultimate choice by both sides to
reframe the conflict. 243 The parties initially

appeared to perceive their dispute as a legal
conflict over rights. They made substantial
progress towards an efficient and effective
solution when both sides perceived the conflict as a multi-faceted problem to be solved
cooperatively, or at least by negotiation.
A closely related element was the creative
pursuit of practical and feasible solutions that
would maximize both sides' interests.244 The
environmentalists defined their interests as
not just stopping or reducing diversions from
Mono Lake's tributaries. Instead, they understood that their interests encompassed the
protection of all water sources that support
ecosystems, and that a Mono Lake victory at
the expense of another watershed would have
meant failure. Likewise, the environmentalists
insightfully perceived that DWP's real interests
revolved around an adequate, feasible, and
reliable supply of water for its rapidly growing
consumers. The environmentalists knew that
DWP could accept reduced diversions if its
interests could be met in other ways. The combination of conservation and reclamation programs enabled by state funding met the parties' primary interests. The solution allowed for
reduced diversions from Mono Lake's tributaries without replacing that water with diversions from another watershed. It did so by
enhancing supply from existing sources and
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stabilizing water supplies over time, and by
reducing demand without reducing the urban
growth and economic activity of Southern
California.
An important factor in reaching agreement
on this solution was public education and
advocacy. Water disputes are highly political.
Economic forces shape political forces, which
in turn shape legal doctrine based on provisions of a state constitution amendable by the
voters. Los Angeles officials needed clear evidence of public support for saving Mono Lake
at the cost of DWP's water rights.
Conservation-based solutions would work only
if consumers accepted them. In this politicaleconomy context, the role of the public education campaign to "save Mono Lake" cannot be
underestimated. Some elements of the public
education and advocacy campaign involved
information about Mono Lake's valuable
ecosystem and the harms caused by excessive
water diversions. Other elements, especially
the bumper stickers and the T-shirts, focused
on building public support and enthusiasm,
without detailed information. Both elements
were critical to the effective application of public trust principles to the Mono Lake conflict.
A final factor important to the parties'
agreement was that of political leadership.
State and federal leaders committed funding
that served as both an incentive and a facilitator of a negotiated solution. Local officials
replaced uncooperative DWP officials with
leaders committed to cooperation and problem-solving. At least one official mediated the
dispute. These leaders' investment of political
capital and public funds in reaching a solution
that would maximize both parties' interests
not only reflected the success of the environmentalists' public education and advocacy
campaign but also moved the dispute past
obstacles and delays to resolution.

243. For discussions on the importance of framing, see
ROGIN HOGARTH, JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE. 104-09 (2d ed. 1987);

244. The classic work on interest-based "win-win" negotiation is ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: BARGAINING WITHOUT

ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE

GIVING IN, 2D ED. (2d.

VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 207-09 (2000); 1. EDWARD Russo & PAUL
I.H. SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPS 15-63 (1989).

ed. 1991).
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VI. Conclusion
The Mono Lake conflict established the
applicability of the public trust doctrine to
appropriative water rights. The California
Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court gave judicial recognition
to the public trust doctrine's potential limits
on prior appropriation rights, and cleverly
imposed on the Water Board the obligation to
balance the two doctrines. The decision implicitly recognized that the real effectiveness of the
doctrine could not be judicially mandated, but
instead depended on the post-litigation
actions of the parties. In the aftermath of
National Audubon, both environmentalists and
water appropriators moved towards practical
and ultimately cooperative solutions of
reduced diversions, publicly funded reclamation projects, and a broad conservation program. These solutions, arguably "win-win" in
that they met the primary interests of both parties, emerged from a mix of litigation, reframing the conflict as a multi-faceted problem
requiring solution, pragmatic assessment of
the parties' respective interests, creative and
practical ideas, public education and advocacy,
and political leadership. The "real" public trust
doctrine exists as much in the post-litigation
interactions of parties that resolve conflicts
and give effect to public trust values as it does
in judicial decisions describing and announcing the doctrine's applicability.
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